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READING KIERKEGAARD: 
TWO PITFALLS AND A STRATEGY 
FOR AVOIDING THEM 
Patrick Goold 
Saren Kierkegaard is an important thinker, especially important for those who 
wish to understand Christian faith. His elusive style, however, and certain 
distancing techniques make him particularly difficult to understand. The re-
cent history of writings on Kierkegaard reveals a strong tendency to fall into 
one of two erroneous modes of interpretation. This essay is an attempt to 
rescue Kierkegaard both from muggings by 'rigorous' philosophers and from 
the morganatic embraces of Post-Modernists. It reviews the classical sources 
of each of these sorts of reading of Kierkegaard, exposes their mistakes, and 
suggests several appropriate principles of interpretation. 
Kierkegaard has much to teach us. On the nature of religious faith, for ex-
ample, there is no author since Paul who is more profound or more enlight-
ening. Deciphering his message, however, is very difficult. For various 
reasons he writes so as to discourage the lazy reader and to perplex those 
with an unreflective cast of mind. Pseudonymity is only the most obvious 
way among many in which he has sought to foil the collectors of conclusions. 
But the deviousness of these devices and the difficulties they present to an 
honest and reflective reader have been greatly exaggerated by interpreters of 
Kierkegaard, often to the point of making nonsense of his work. Some see 
his writings as entirely poetic (ironic) and as unconcerned with the sort of 
truth that preoccupies science or philosophy. Others find it patently self-re-
futing. Both readings made Kierkegaard unworthy of rational criticism, the 
latter because he never gets off the ground, the former because he never 
touches down. Both views rest on a failure to read carefully and to make 
needed distinctions, and both are mistaken. 
Every interpretation that makes Kierkegaard's writings opaque to rational 
analysis is based, it seems to me, upon a failure to make an obvious and 
elementary distinction between levels of discourse. Every such interpretation 
fails to distinguish between those passages in which Kierkegaard is 
'existentializing' or 'doing existential philosophy' from those in which he is 
writing about the nature, content, structure, etc. of his existentializing. This 
familiar and useful distinction between discourse within a realm of discourse 
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and discourse about that realm is important here not because it allows us "to 
make inwardness academically respectable" or "to give human existence the 
dubious prestige of professorial sanction,"l but because it allows us to avoid 
making nonsense of Kierkegaard. The inanation of Kierkegaard resulting 
from failure to observe this distinction takes two forms. The form most 
commonly in evidence among philosophers might be called 'over-literaliza-
tion,' the alternative 'over-poeticization.' Both approaches have the logical 
(if not always consciously intended) result of making Kierkegaard either 
self-refuting or vacuous. 
Over-Literalization 
Examples of the pitfalls of over-literalization abound. Climacus is the most 
prolific provocateur of interpretative failures of this sort, and of all the things 
he says none is more thoroughly misunderstood by literal-minded philoso-
phers than the 'doctrine' that truth is subjectivity. A. E. Murphy, Paul Ed-
wards, and Brand Blanshard, for example, all make the same sort of attack 
on subjective truth, a sort of attack that sensitivity to Climacus' therapeutic 
use of language would obviate. Murphy writes: 
While it ostensibly turns away from the issue of objective truth, 
Kierkegaard's procedure presupposes such truth at every step in its retreat 
into recessive inwardness. His subjectivity is parasitic for its 'existential' 
significance on the assumed objective truth of a doctrine about man and God 
whose right to claim such truth it strives at every point to discredit.2 
Edwards contends that "Kierkegaard reverts and must revert from the new 
sense of 'true' in which to say that a belief is true means no more than that 
it is held sincerely and without reservations, to the old sense in which it means 
that it is in accordance with the facts or with reality."3 And Blanshard thinks 
that the author of "truth is subjectivity," because of this ambiguity in his 
position, faces the following dilemma: 
His philosophy terminates in a rejection of those very principles of logic on 
which he proceeded as a philosopher .... If the logic he assumes in his phi-
losophy is valid, then the faith ('truth' would work equally well here) which 
stands at the summit of 'the stages on life's way' is meaningless. If that 
irrational faith is accepted, the principles on which reflection conducts itself 
are everywhere impugned. In that case, Kierkegaard ... should remain silent.4 
Murphy starts out on the right track here. The man who is "in the truth" in the 
Climacean sense does indeed "tum away" from the issue of objective truth, not 
merely ostensibly but in fact, and with total decisiveness. And the procedure by 
means of which he accomplishes this is precisely "to presuppose such truth at 
every step." For example, finding God objectively, i.e. proving his existence, 
is not a concern of the subjective thinker because he seizes his certainty 
directly, before the proof can ever begin. He is satisfied to have at once a 
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"militant certainty, "S rather than wait for the completion of proofs to satisfy 
him. He does not, however, do this because he feels what he believes must 
be objectively false, but because he knows that the objective truth of what 
he believes cannot come to light in time. The distinction is large, and this is 
where the second part of Murphy's statement goes astray. He sees Climacus 
as attempting to discredit, for example, the believer's right to claim that God 
has in fact existed. Climacus does not deny that the believer holds his beliefs 
to be objectively true, this is not what his "turning away from the question 
to objective truth" amounts to at all. Rather he is denying that the believer 
can claim to know that his beliefs are true, indeed he takes it to be a require-
ment for faith that one understand the necessity of uncertainty in this manner. 
All this is in the text, but obscure and difficult to grasp if one takes the 
point of "truth is subjectivity" to be a new conceptual determination of the 
property people have traditionally tried to get at with the notion of objective 
truth. This is not what is going on here. Climacus is using the term 'truth' in 
his definition in the sense in which it was commonly used by his contempo-
raries. He has Hegel in mind, and the Hegelian distinction between truth and 
correctness, truth being the according of a thing with its concept. Climacus 
employs this notion to define a very small subspecies of truth, the truth of 
an existing individual human being. Instead of redefining 'truth' Climacus is 
laying out what the truth (as commonly understood) of the individual consists 
in. The result is not a new 'truth' which is to usurp the role of the old one, 
but an explication of the 'old truth' applied to a new object, i.e. the single 
existing individual. It is called by the name 'subjective truth' because ulti-
mately the 'objective' truth of the existing individual consists in his entire 
identification with his own subjectivity. 
Of course, "truth is subjectivity" is not the most perspicuous formulation 
of such an insight. If one is pre-occupied with a different problematic, one 
that takes propositions to be the proper objects of belief and truth to be a 
property solely of propositions, then it is not surprising that one comes to the 
wrong conclusion. This less than perfectly perspicuous rendering, however, 
can be accounted for as more edifying than more patent ones. 
The point of real existentializing is to open the eyes of one's readers to 
new ways of living and to move them to reshape their lives. The first step 
toward this goal is moving them to a passionate interest in the question. 
Climacus uses the verbal identity to emphasize the contextual difference 
between the truth of human existence and the truth of propositions. People 
alive to his edificatory purpose would not mistake him here. To ignore this 
purpose and to proceed as if Climacus were choosing his words for a disin-
terested academic audience is Murphy's downfall. It is also the misdirection 
in the accounts of Edwards and Blanshard.6 
Misled by the literal (immanent) sense of "truth is subjectivity" into as-
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suming that subjective truth is put forward as a REPLACEMENT for objec-
tive truth, Blanshard concludes that the search for subjective truth requires 
"a rejection of logic." And with this conclusion before his eyes he is blind 
to the genuine meta-position that justifies the edificatory rhetoric. 
Blanshard's picture could not be more misleading. Climacus gives an account 
of the necessary and (presumably) sufficient conditions for an individual 
human being to be true, or "in the truth." One of these conditions is dialectical 
insight into the impossibility in principle of attaining objective certainty 
concerning what is believed. Thus the subject who would be "in the truth" 
rather than being required to reject logic is obligated to reach a dialectically 
very sophisticated position with respect to his beliefs. "With all the strength 
of his mind, to the last thought, he must try to understand ... and then despair 
of the understanding" [CUP, p. 201]. It is the attempt to understand that 
entitles him to despair, the latter without the former is unjustified, or more 
accurately, impossible. 
Reason, in the Climacean scheme, provides an important service for faith. 
"The highest principles for all thought can be demonstrated only indirectly 
(negatively)" [CUP, p. 197]. The last three words are an important qualification 
of "demonstrated" but they by no means nullify it. The role of an indirect 
demonstration might still be very important indeed, as Climacus points out in 
the following: "For dialectics is in its truth a benevolent helper, which discov-
ers and assists in finding where the absolute object of faith and worship is .... 
Dialectics7 itself does not see the absolute, but it leads, as it were, the indi-
vidual up to it, and says: 'Here it must be, that I guarantee; when you worship 
here, you worship God" [CUP, p. 43Sf.]. It accomplishes all this "only indi-
rectly," of course, i.e. it makes clear what the absolute is not. So, for example, 
it tells one that neither God nor an eternal happiness is such that it can be 
pointed out, pictured, imagined, described poetically, and so forth. It reveals 
that true religiousness is not such that any outward show is demanded. It 
proves that the object of belief is not an object of speculation as well, and that 
it is not something subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by the results 
of historical inquiry. Thus the picture Climacus draws of the relationship 
between faith and reason is this: reason's task is carefully and deeply to ponder 
the matters of infinite importance to us, and diligently to apply the standard 
of consistencyS to our conception of the matter and to the existential expres-
sion we have given it. If we adduce a conception and an expression for it which 
stands unfalsified by the dialectical scrutiny, then we are at a point where it 
is appropriate to believe our conception to be the right one. 
This is not to say that our belief has been rationally justified, because all 
these dialectical labors take place within the framework of our belief, i.e. our 
belief constitutes the unargued-for presupposition of the search for consis-
tency. It is passion alone which motivates one initially to embrace a given 
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framework. One might, for example, believe that pleasure is the ultimate goal 
of human existence and with this belief as datum dialectics might lead him 
to see that really to hold this one must become a 'solipsist of the present 
moment.' But if one were motivated by an infinite passion, such a solipsism 
would not be satisfying, and so one's passion would drive one to leap beyond 
it, into (say) the comfort of the ethical and its universality. At each stage 
dialectic, the critical use of our understanding, reveals to us the consistent 
formulation of an expression for what we believe, but this in no way justifies 
our adoption of that belief. This is a task, as Anti-Climacus will argue in 
Sickness Unto Death, for the passion itself. For these reasons the Hegelians 
are damned on two counts: they are dialectically inconsistent and completely 
lacking in passion; while Zeno is praised for the consistency of his life and 
doctrine, but ultimately rejected because a way of deeper passion is possible. 
Ultimately, this search for the deepest possible passion is justified by ap-
peal to an ethics of virtue, coupled with a definite theory about human nature, 
something Alasdair MacIntyre does not seem to recognize when he phrases 
the objection to Climacus in these terms: 
If I hold that truth is subjectivity, what status am I to give to the denial of 
the proposition that truth is subjectivity? If I produce arguments to refute this 
denial I appear committed to the view that there are criteria by appeal to 
which the truth about truth can be vindicated. If I refuse to produce argu-
ments, on the ground that there can be neither argument nor criteria in such 
a case, then I appear committed to the view that any view embraced with 
sufficient subjective passion is as warranted as any other in respect of truth, 
including the view that truth is not subjectivity. This inescapable dilemma is 
never faced by Kierkegaard and consequently he remains trapped by it.9 
There is one fact, however, that is true at every stage on life's way and in 
every possible existential attitude: the person who occupies that stage is an 
existing individual. And if Climacus, who is at one stage, grasps what it 
means to be an existing human being in truth (and this is what the definition 
of truth is intended to describe), then he possesses a notion that is at least 
implicitly contained in all others. And if he can show that the truth of, e.g. 
the metaphysical sphere consistently followed contradicts this human truth, 
then he can show (since the metaphysician is himself human) that eo ipso the 
metaphysician contradicts himself existentially. Climacus has in this fact of 
existence an objective (in the sense that it is necessarily and universally 
applicable) criterion by which the validity of any existential stage may be 
evaluated. In Aristotelian terms, man's specific ergon, to do well at what is 
his virtue or specific excellence (and in one sense, his truth), is to maximize 
his own subjectivity. And Climacus can assert this as objectively true without 
thereby contradicting himself, and without committing himself to the equi-
pollence of all objective assertions. 
Climacus is not satisfied simply to state this imperative to maximize one's 
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subjectivity. He also undertakes the therapeutic task of producing this state 
in his readers. One of the tools he uses in doing this is compressed and 
pseudo-paradoxical language like "truth is subjectivity," in which familiar 
terms are purposely imported into new and unanticipated contexts to reveal 
new facets of the concepts they refer to. To make his doctrine clear, one might 
distinguish between truth in the sense of correctness, a sense in which only 
sentences and propositions are true, and truth in the sense of soundness in 
which any entity whatsoever may be true. Then the Climacean doctrine might 
be formulated as "The following is a correct assertion: 'A human being is 
sound when he or she maximizes his or her own subjectivity. ", But if one 
wishes to go beyond the mere statement of doctrine, and to proceed to the 
edification of one's readers, the original formulation might well be prefera-
ble. Forgetting that Climacus wants to go beyond mere statement in this way 
is the source of the mistakes of Murphy and company. 
Over-literalization, of course, can take other forms. Many authors, thinking 
of one or another of the pseudonyms, take Kierkegaard to task for his one-
sided and extreme view of Christianity. But to ignore the poetic indirection 
of the pseUdonyms is to miss much of the point of the pseudonymous books 
and to tum Kierkegaard into a schizophrenic. Humor and irony are other 
means he uses to protect himself from being given a position of authority, 
and from being merely informative rather than edifying. I chose to focus on 
the trick of paradoxical word-choice only because it has led to a particularly 
pervasive and egregious misunderstanding. 
Over-Poeticization 
In Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Louis Mackey established himself as the 
over-poeticizer laureate. Emphasizing the edificatory function of the pseud-
onyms at the expense of the meta-theoretical ideas that inform the edificatory 
project, Mackey unintentionally volatilizes Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's 
books are reduced to rhetorical smoke, the substance of his discourse dis-
persed. "Kierkegaard's poetic is at once a rhetoric designed to coerce its 
reader to freedom," and in so doing it "deprives him of any warrant for action 
except his own freedom." Is there no warrant whatsoever? Then all the argu-
ment of the pseudonyms is sham. "The Kierkegaardian corpus can neither be 
'believed' nor 'followed': it is and was meant to be-poetically-the impe-
tus, the occasion, and the demand for the reader's own advance to selfhood 
and to a solitary meeting with the divine. "10 For the most part this is an 
eloquent statement of the edifying purpose of Kierkegaard's authorship. In 
the denial of "any warrant" for acting in a certain way, however, it goes too 
far, making Kierkegaard's position self-undermining in much the same way 
that Blanshard's over-literal reading does. 
For what is Mackey'S evidence that so single-minded a focus on inwardness 
310 Faith and Philosophy 
was Kierkegaard's intention? He quotes Johannes Climacus. But why is this 
to the point? Because Climacus has a meta-theory about subjective truth that 
shows WHY it cannot be communicated directly, and why the pseudonyms, 
the humor and irony, the paradoxical language, etc., are necessary. This, 
however, is to the point only if at least some of what Climacus says can itself 
be believed to be objectively true. But this is precisely what Mackey denies, 
hence his over-emphasis of the poetic undermines his own argument for that 
emphasis. Josiah Thompson is more consistent when he labels even the doc-
trine of indirect communication part of the pseudonymous charade. I I 
The schizophrenia of Mackey's position is compactly expressed in his 
statements about Kierkegaard's intentions. He speaks of ~the impropriety of 
presuming to read Kierkegaard's mind" and maintains that ~taken as instru-
ments of his intent, his works add up to a magnificent nonsense. "12 But I have 
already quoted a passage in which Mackey claims to know the purpose for 
which Kierkegaard's poetic is designed, and of course, telling us what 
Kierkegaard intended by this profusion of ink is precisely what every com-
mentator, including Mackey, has as his central task. Mackey knows this. The 
final paragraph of his book makes reference to "Kierkegaard's thought," "the 
mind of Kierkegaard," and even what it is "to understand Kierkegaard." What 
he doesn't see is that this is impossible if nothing in the authorship can be 
taken to be intended as literal truth, or can be mapped onto the literally true. 
It might be objected that although Mackey has made a tactical blunder here, 
the damage can be easily repaired. Frequently, instead of quoting Climacus 
or another pseudonym to support his views, Mackey quotes The Point a/View, 
Journals and Papers, or some other non-pseudonymous work. And were he 
consistent about this, so the counter runs, he would have a stable meta-posi-
tion, the ~real" Kierkegaard, to argue from. Stephen Evans argues for a view 
like this. After correctly noting that to say Kierkegaard's views are indepen-
dent of those of his pseudonyms is not to say that Kierkegaard's views are 
in every case opposed to those of his pseudonyms, he continues: 13 
As a matter of fact, it is not hard to show that a good many of the opinions 
expressed by the pseudonyms were held by Kierkegaard himself. The method 
whereby this can be done is simply to compare the pseudonymous works with 
works that Kierkegaard wrote under his own name and with his opinions as 
expressed in his Journals and Papers. 
Although I have at one time found this position attractive, I believe it now 
to be unsafe. The occasion of this change was Henning Fenger's Kierkegaard: 
The Myths and Their Origins. Fenger argues plausibly that Kierkegaard was 
a poet even in his putatively private writings, that he falsified, poeticized, 
tidied and 'corrected' historical facts throughout his letters and journals, and 
that even in these writings Kierkegaard was engaged in a literary production. 
Where literal truth is our goal, we are no better off looking in the letters and 
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journals, and by extension, the other non-pseudonymous works, than in the 
pseudonymous ones.14 To put it the other way round, there is no a priori 
ground for rejecting the meta-theoretical material contained in the pseudon-
ymous works. The remaining problem is to establish a criterion by means of 
which one can decide when and how to take a given pseudonym seriously. 
The Correct Approach 
When he is not trying to convince us that Kierkegaard is "only poetry," 
Mackey is aware that sometimes the pseudonyms must be taken at their word. 
He admits that "there is some truth to be found in the mouth of each of the 
pseudonyms." He is even willing to admit that "in a sense the whole truth, 
as Kierkegaard understood it, is found in each of the works. "15 It is, however, 
distorted by partiality. Mackey suggests the following methodological prin-
ciple for those who would sort the chaff of partiality from the kernel of truth: 
"whatever truth and reality is imagined in the Kierkegaardian corpus must be 
sought in the internal organization of the several works and in the reciprocal 
limitation and reinforcement they offer each other."16 This, I think is sound 
as far as it goes and it is the main source of my confidence in my reading of 
Kierkegaard. I am convinced, for example, that the notion of obedience is 
central to Kierkegaard's understanding of faith, because pseudonyms as dif-
ferent from one another as De Silentio, Climacus, and Anti-Climacus, char-
acters who are described as being at different stages of intellectual and ethical 
insight, take up this theme again and again and develop it in similar ways. 
Moreover, the theme of 'obedience as the heart of religious faith' runs 
through the Journals and Papers, and many of the non-pseudonymous pub-
lished works such as On Authority and Revelation, O/The Difference Between 
a Genuis and an Apostle, and several of the Edifying Discourses. That sources 
so dissimilar in other ways offer "reciprocal reinforcement" to each other in 
specifying the relationship between obedience and faith indicates that this 
relationship is part of the literal, meta-theoretical kernel of Kierkegaard's 
thought. The focus on obedience shows clearly through the partiality of the 
various pseudonyms. 
If this is correct, then there is an interpretative principle that readers of 
Kierkegaard can rely on: the more generally a theme is found in 
Kierkegaard's writings, and the greater the similarity in the conclusions of 
the various treatments of this theme, the more likely it is that something like 
the view one can derive from these treatments was actually held by 
Kierkegaard. This principle gives us a means of justifying the claim that, 
Mackey and Thompson to the contrary notwithstanding, genuinely substan-
tive conclusions can be drawn from the Kierkegaardian corpus. 
A second justification for reading Kierkegaard with philosophical serious-
ness can be drawn from an application of the reciprocal reinforcement ptin-
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ciple to his writings. To the objection that an approach so 'didactic' cannot 
lay hold of a 'subjective' author, i.e. one who communicates 'indirectly,' it 
is enlightening to examine the evidence that Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms 
have left us in the form of their actual practice on this score. This practice 
is observable in diverse parts of the authorship, it is sufficiently uniform as 
fairly to be called the same practice, and it is clearly at variance with the 
volatilizing approach of, for example, Thompson. To cite some of the clearer 
examples: (1) Kierkegaard frequently interprets the work of the pseudonyms 
in Journals and Papers, and comes to definite conclusions about what they 
meant. See, for example, Journals and Papers 11,11 in which Kierkegaard 
sorts out the difference between "the absurd" in Fear and Trembling and "the 
paradox" in CUP. His technique implies that this is a close reading by a third 
party, but it does not suggest that there is nothing clear to be gotten from 
these books. In fact, it suggests precisely the reverse, it suggests that they 
will stand up to very close critical scrutiny. (2) Anti-Climacus refers to the 
work of Johannes Climacus, and not to turn him into poetry, but to cite him 
as an authority with whom Anti-Climacus is in clear agreement,18 Moreover, 
this agreement is with respect to the very doctrine that the poeticizers would 
use to evaporate the pseudonyms, indirect communication. (3) Climacus [in 
CUP, pp. 225-66] surveys much of the previous pseudonymous literature, and 
even a book by "Magister Kierkegaard" himself. And he does not suggest 
that what is written there is something that can have no literal sense for him. 
In fact, he opens by saying that in Either/Or "was realized precisely what I 
had proposed to myself to do" [CUP, p. 225]. He allows that there is room 
for interpretation. Nevertheless, the "misused" in the following quotation 
gives evidence that he thinks it is possible to determine what is right in it. 
Every time I read through such a pseudonymous work, it became clearer to 
me what I had intended to do. In this manner I became a tragicomically 
interested witness of the productions of Victor Eremita and the other pseud-
onyms. Whether my interpretation is the same as that of the authors, I can of 
course not know with certainty, since I am only a reader; on the other hand, 
it gives me pleasure to see that the pseudonyms, presumably aware of the 
relation subsisting between the method of indirect communication and the 
truth as inwardness, have themselves said nothing, nor misused a preface to 
assume an official attitude toward the production, as if an author were in a 
purely legal sense the best interpreter of his own words .... [CUP, p. 225] 
The quotation also contains, I think, a description of the major fault which 
it is the function of pseudonymity to avoid: the assumption of "an official 
attitude toward the production," i.e. putting it forward as if one had the 
authority to proclaim it objectively. If it is correct to see this as the main 
function of the device of pseudonymity, then probably much too much has 
been made of this device and the notion of indirect communication by the 
poeticizing school. 
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(4) Perhaps the most striking example of the proper way of approaching a 
"subjective" author is Climacus' reading of Lessing in the second book of 
CUP [pp. 67-114]. Its conclusions are the same: one should be grateful to 
Lessing because he maintains his distance and does not directly proclaim his 
insights into the religious. Why is this something to be grateful for? Because 
it preserves and strengthens the edifying, rather than the merely informative, 
function of Lessing's writing. We are to be grateful to him because the literal 
truths to which he has worked his way are framed in such a way that we are 
forced to think our way to them, and through them, for ourselves. And this 
is a benefit to us because the truths are about the proper mode of existing as 
a human being, something we should not only wish to know, but to do. In 
short, we should be grateful to Lessing for writing as he did for reasons much 
different from the ones that oblige us to admire Rimbaud. 
Of course, if all the texts have a pseudonymous taint (including Journals 
and Papers and the letters), and if it is largely on the "reciprocal reinforce-
ment" of the pseudonyms that one must rely, then it will never be possible 
to say that one's interpretation is the one correct description of Kierkegaard's 
intentions. Every interpreter of Kierkegaard will need to keep in mind a 
caveat similar to the one with which Climacus prefaces his discussion of 
Lessing in CUP: 
Without presuming to appeal to Lessing or daring to cite him definitely as my 
authority, without pledging anyone because of Lessing's fame dutifully to 
understand or profess to understand that which brings him into embarrassing 
connection with my obscurity ... I now propose to set forth what, in spite of 
all, I refer to Lessing, although uncertain whether he would acknowledge it. 
But one ought not to make too much of this necessary humility. 
That all our ascriptions must to some extent be tentative is finally of little 
consequence. First of all, it is a sufficient ground for invoking Kierkegaard's 
name that one's account is a possible interpretation of his work, that one has 
arguments in its favor, and that it explains certain aspects of the texts that 
are not otherwise well understood. Secondly, and more importantly, the goal 
of the philosophical reader is enlightenment, and to the project of understand-
ing, for example, the actual structure of religious faith, meticulous scholarly 
questions about the correct attribution of views to Kierkegaard are irrelevant. 
The philosophical reader simply need not address them. Evans states the case 
well when he says: 
Biographers and intellectual historians have a right to examine the pseudon-
ymous literature and use it as best they can to fulfill their goals of under-
standing Kierkegaard's life and thought. (Though in view of Kierkegaard's 
warnings they should employ extreme caution in doing so.) But if our pur-
poses are essentially personal and philosophical-if we are interested in the 
truth of the views presented, in understanding more profoundly some basic 
existential concepts, and thereby understanding ourselves and our existence 
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more deeply-then it really does not matter very much whether Kierkegaard 
personally held these views. For from the fact that he held a view nothing 
follows as to the truth, profundity, or value of the view. 19 
This said, however, it does not follow that Kierkegaard disappears from the 
scene. If by reading and reflecting on his work we are lead to views both true 
and profound, then we owe him grateful acknowledgement whether or not 
we can say with certainty that these are precisely the views he intended us 
to find there. Such acknowledgement is entirely consistent with the 
'doctrines' of indirect communication and the subjectivity of truth. 
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